Four the Hard Way

Four the Hard Way

No one reads blogs on the weekends, but if you check out anything today I hope it’s four pieces by a quartet of previous contributors here.

The ghost of SWJ past, Mike Few, continues to haunt the COIN Scrooge with a very fine interview he did with the great scholar of the American Civil War, Mark Grimsley.

A lot of people don’t know this, but  two keen voices of military scholarship, Grimsley and David Betz from Kings College, both served as NCOs in their respective armies (David is a Canadian now living in Britain).  I’ve always thought that their earlier careers inform their perspectives on war, but none of that would matter without their refined scholarship.


Please check it out.  Although I worry that if Michael gets good at the Q&A thing, people like me will be out of a job.

Our favorite Marine pilot-blogger Peter “Munson Doctrine” Munson (he hates that!) has a new piece up on FP, “Small Wars, Big Prices.”

I think he’s wrong about Vietnam – the U.S. entered into the conflict realizing full well that we would be fighting a counterinsurgency,  just not for as long or as hard for the results that we achieved.

Sure, he caricatures my position (what, I never talk about strategy here?  Really?  REALLY?  I think C.E. Callwell’s estate sends me royalties and the great-great-great-grandson of Clausewitz tweets my more provocative posts), but we can overlook that because he’s trying to make a rhetorical point.

Still, good articles are those you find yourself arguing with, so read it.

Our favorite Army pilot-blogger Crispin “Starbuck” Burke’s “Like it or not, small wars will always be around” is noteworthy as much for its even-handed approach to what often can be a tricky topic but also to see how his own thoughts have evolved over the years.  I think he’s wrong about some matters, but he’s not wrong to push the debate along.

The other contributor is, in the Liddell-Hart sense, one who attacks LoD indirectly.  “Madhu”  likes to hit with her comments and run, but she has a blog, “On Park Street,” a subsidiary of the Chicago Boyz, and she plucked an intriguing want ad from the local media: “Some private security firms around Chicago are looking to beef up their ranks with Iraq and Afghanistan war vets ahead of two world summits that are expected to bring multitudes of protesters to the city this spring.”

Now, I can’t prove that “Dr Madhu” isn’t a neo-con performance art collective in Chickamagua, Ga., but she has an acerbic humor and an eye for detail.

Check her – or him, or them, or whatever – out!  Especially if you’re her family.  I think she would appreciate that.

And call more often!

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Great suggestions. Hope you have some fun this weekend.

Carl, I agree with your point about Vietnam in a way. Some realized it would be COIN, others saw it as a conventional battle against NVA with an insurgent sideshow, others saw it as a campaign of Cold War deterrence messaging, or resolve and support of allies. The purported reasons for entry of combat troops was really a rear area security mission, not COIN. I think Vietnam fits the argument well.

Peter, overall and excellent, excellent piece.

I am with Carl though on the more minor point within your article on rationale for US entrance into Vietnam. You are right that the first ground combat troops (marines) were brought in to secure air bases, but by that point in time Westmoreland already had his sights on increasing troop numbers and an operational plan to use US forces to go after main force units (NVA and VC) while the ARVN was directed at pacification. Still, the overall political goal for the US was quite clear at the beginning and remained so throughout: maintain the efficacy of the South Vietnamese Government. The muddle that you rightly mention had more to do with something else you poked at in your piece: the belief by both military and political leaders that even in the face of such a daunting task, military power could accomplish it. In a sense, there was no appreciation for the very limits of military force in these kinds of conflicts. And it is in this that Petraeus (in Iraq and Afghanistan) is much more like Westmoreland than most people realize.

Although you and I also agree that Westmoreland had to fight two types of war, and that Abrams largely continued this policy, too.

That is correct, all of the force structures, organizations, and operational framework that Abams used were started under Westmoreland. Aside from differences in personality and leadership style, they were two generals who fought the war very much in the same way. The only thing that really changed for Abrams is that the policy changed during his tenure to Vietnamization.

What is interesting when looking at Southern Conservative Whites, North Vietnamese, Sunnis in Iraq, or Scots in Braveheart (yes, I watched it again last night-Freedom!!!), is the concept of resistance, struggle, or dau tranh to continue fighting politically or militarily until you regain what Grimsley calls “Home Rule.”

Thanks for highlighting that ad, Carl. The “Second City Cop” blog noted it, too:

“A reader sent this in from the Illinois State Crime Commission/Police Athletic League website. Interesting:

Member companies of the Illinois State Crime Commission/Police Athletic League of Illinois have an urgent need to employ Iraq Afghanistan Veterans for security positions during the G-8 conference. These jobs will pay $20-$30 per hour and may lead to permanent full benefit employment. All must be prepared for security clearances including background check and drug testing.“
http://​secondcitycop​.blogspot​.com/​2​0​1​2​/​0​1​/​h​i​r​i​ng-…

That widely read blog is not very, er, comforting on the topic of the upcoming summit.

Madhu, I added your blog post to a comment over at SWJ on bringing back militias and the discussion over mercenaries.

If I WERE the online creation of some male blogger, I’d likely be nicer, younger-seeming, and more flirtatious. Perhaps with photodocumentary evidence as illustration. That is not a dig on “courtneyme” or anybody. I am describing a facet of human nature.

Thanks for using a nice word like “acerbic.” I probably deserve a much less nice word given my online behavior on the topic of “afpak.” The frustrations I feel when I read a military or civilian expert discuss the supposed motivations of regional parties spills over into this space. A lot.

On the family thing; that’s our little joke : ) No one reads my blog! Anyway, communication isn’t a problem because Indian, or American + Indian, families are communitarian, busybody, in-your-business, “hive-minds.” Kidding. They find my interest in these topics uncharacteristic. It is, to be fair.

Thanks. I guess I should mention that private security firms are looking for private businesses? It’s nothing to do with government security which is entirely separate from what I’ve read. But that doesn’t negate your points, I think?

Nope. It’s a question of how are we going to police and secure ourselves domestically. Also see the Supreme Courts recent decision to force groups to get a warrant prior to putting a GPS on a suspects car. That’s a step in the right direction.

This is a topic I am very interested in because I am hearing a lot of complaints from locals about the situation in and around the city and suburbs. What I mean is that local officials say that crime is down — and trending down — but a lot of citizens feel that isn’t so. You can see the back and forth in the papers and on blogs. Recently, the local gun bans were struck down by the courts. There is a lot of discussion on this topic. It is an area of contention between official statements and citizen perceptions.

Although, if the “Chicago Boyz” were to confect you, you might be the avatar we find helming “On Park Street.” It’s not as if University of Chicago alums are known for their half-naked coeds caught on film in some pillow-fighting bacchanal over the latest polemic of Fred Kagan.

Although both the group project that’s Courtney Messerschmidt and the CBz might share a certain unnatural affinity for a pinup of Caroline Glick. Or Gertrude Himmelfarb.

As a Chicago Boy, I can confirm that there were no pillow-fighting bacchanals over the latest polemics of Fred Kagan — however, interdorm (“house,” to use the U of C’s argot) skirmishes over the musings of Ikle, Wohlstetter, Wolfowitz and the like were, and so far as I know remain, rather raucous.

ADTS

To Peter Munson et al:

I’m posting here and on your (i.e., Major Munson’s) blog primarily if not exclusively because I’m an attention whore. (Will Carl’s spam software let me use that word?) Respond, if you wish, where you wish. I read your piece en totale, complete with underlining (my preferred method for something I really want to understand), and found it absolutely excellent. Much to my chagrin, and contrary to my expectations and intent, I really could not find any genuine fault in it. Kudos.

That said, a thought or two. Have you surveyed the “universe of cases?” Are there outliers that can shed light on the dynamics you highlight? What are American small wars that have been well-prosecuted? I know nothing about it, but didn’t we intervene in the Dominican Republic circa 1965, and perhaps the fact that I know little about it indicates that it went well (contra, say, Somalia and “Black Hawk Down”)? What impediments matter when? Did the Dominican Republic “go well” (if it did) because it occurred during the Cold War (and not after the draft was ended?) or for other reasons? And to raise a point I brought up on your blog some time ago, what about Mike Few’s “favorite cases” (apologies if I’m distorting your argument, Mike Few) — Colombia, El Salvador, or the contemporary Philippines? For that matter, speaking of the devil, was American COIN *strategy* well-developed and –executed during the fin-de-siecle savage war of piece in that island archipelago, and if so, why, and if not, was that because of the reasons you specify in your essay?

Finally, the invocation of Fukuyama — who wrote “The End of History” at the University of Chicago (see my response to Carl Prine in re: Madhu, Courtney Messerschmidt and interhouse U of C debauchery academic debauchery) — made me thing of a phrase Paul Yingling used in one his essays: “self-correcting behavior.” First, Fukuyama has become quite the dissident from the neocon pack with which he used to run. More generally, the consensus (such as I can glean from blogs such as this, Abu M, SWJ, etc.), and my sense of the 2012 election season (and/or Robert Gates’s “head examined” comment), seems to be that large-scale COIN neither is nor will be in vogue anytime soon. Is, to use the ideas of Kenneth Waltz, the US becoming socialized to the strategic reality it now confronts?

Apologies if a comment composed mostly of questions comes off as grating (although I don’t think it does, and certainly hope it doesn’t). Once more, excellent piece — much enjoyed.

ADTS

Ha! — Carl’s spam software did not let me use that word.

ADTS

Paul Yingling — also a Chicago Boy, now that I think of it!

Alright, enough alma mater fluffing, especially since I did my alumni duty last week (interviewing a prospective college student) and given I have strong mixed feelings regarding the institution.

ADTS

ADTS,

I think that both Peter and I are trying to look at the world past simply military intervention (Peter, correct me if I’m wrong). When looking at the Phillipines, El Sal, or Colombia, those are the “best” ways to use military force (i.e. FID). However, in the bigger picture, why must we use military force? Are these military efforts actually providing the effects to secure National Security Needs?

For the past four years, I have studied the “universe of cases” of American military intervention over the past 200 years. The results are not that good. Even with the Phillipines, we can’t simply look at the GWOT intervention. It must be examined over a 100 year time period going back to when the Spanish left.

Moreover, what I’m finding interesting today is that many in the East are rejecting Western intervention (military, economic, etc). They are seeking their version of the American Dream which is to find your own way towards your version of capitalism and democracy.

Simply put, they want to be like us, but they don’t want us to force them to be like us.

Now compare that with my interview with Mark Grimsley and how the United States Government brought the Southern States back into the fold after the Civil War.

Mike:

If the universe of cases is representative and captures the reality of what Munson writes, that is all to the good, and kudos to you as well for taking the time to go through and glean the lessons of the exhaustive gamut. That having been said, a short note about the intent of what I wrote: This kind of reminds me of the introduction to Munson’s article he, you and I corresponded about a few weeks back, in which you said I was “taking care of the quants,” to which I took no offense but also replied “Not my intent.” Rather, I stated, my intent was to hopefully gainfully clarity by sharpening concepts and definitions. Here, too, my intent was really just to suggest additional ways of examining the argument, e.g., by looking at outliers and unrepresentative cases. I also wished to introduce another causal logic possibly at play, e.g., learning/self-correcting behavior/Waltzian socialization.

I think what you wrote here speaks more to the broader picture, whereas (as just noted) I was focused more on research design. I certainly have no problem with using instruments of national power other than military ones to achieve foreign policy objectives. Whether we have a foreign policy establishment that predisposes us toward certain means with respect ends is certainly a question worth asking.

As for whether the East rejects Western intervention, I both demur and rebut. I demur in part because my knowledge is, or at least may be, too limited to offer any sort of informed opinion (although I demur cautiously — as my not surprise you, I don’t think what opinions I do hold are baseless, even if they are not those of an expert). My prime motive for rebuttal is the utter sweepingness of the statement, and my (slight) recoil at the binary of East and West, or at least the presumption of a unified “East” — to me the argument strikes me as overly reductionist to say the least. Is an advanced industrialized democracy such as Korea or Japan included in your definition of this East, or is your East less a geographic demarcation and rather one of socioeconomic development (to be crude, maybe, Third versus First World?)?

I recall enjoying your interview on Grimsley, but confess to not reading it closely, and don’t remember it particularly well. In closing, I do wish to applaud your focus on the Civil War and Reconstruction, though, and think it, along with the American Revolution, can only be beneficial (especially for Americans — far easier perhaps to empathize with the participants and actors, and less new history to learn, along with the other benefits). I shall go back and read it again.

Regards
ADTS

ADTS,

Pardon me while I burst into flames.…

Failing into Collaboration? http://​smallwarsjournal​.com/​b​l​o​g​/​f​a​i​l​i​n​g​-​i​n​t​o​-​col…

Never thought I would see an Incubus reference on a military blog.…..

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