Yon Owes Us More

Yon Owes Us More

For years, I’ve argued with Michael Yon.  I’ve also defended Michael Yon.  I’ve even tried to settle milblogger spats involving Michael Yon.

But I’ve never been disappointed with a post submitted by Yon until his recent telegraph to our readers, “Time to Leave Afghanistan.”

Perhaps “Time to Leave” was hastily scribbled.   It’s certainly brief.  And both of those factors might’ve conspired to make the effort so lamentably bad.  But we can’t end our criticism of it there.


That’s because Mike apparently is now making statements he’s never trotted out so prominently before:  1) In the balance of expenditures and benefits, the war now costs us too much blood and treasure; 2) By spending billions of dollars there, we’re losing out on opportunities  more valuable to American security; 3)  It’s time for Afghan security forces and the central government to stand up and fight, and we’re retarding that; 4) Pakistan shall never become an ally of the U.S.; 5) We’re not “serious” about winning the war; 6) The mostly Pashto-speaking peoples in rebellion have a home court advantage we can’t surmount; and, between the lines, 7) Much of our failure in Kabul can be traced to the change in leadership from U.S. Army Gen. David Petraeus to U.S. Marine Corps Gen. John R. Allen.

I’ve been highly critical of the way the International Security Assistance Force has sold their lint-brained measurements of “progress” in Afghanistan and the so-called “strategy” confected by our betters, not to mention the careerist and financially-motivated salesmen pushing a generation-long conflict there.  But I’ve remained agnostic on the question of whether our nation should be fighting the Taliban, largely because I think to express an opinion one way or the other on that would put me way out of my lane.

The strong distaste I have for Michael’s piece isn’t based on my own beliefs about staying in one’s lane, however, but rather is tied to the lack of seriousness in his analysis and an even greater deficit in personal accountability for his past statements.

I say this because Yon consistently has been one of the loudest cheerleaders for the very policies that led to the downward “trajectory” he now derides and he has to own that.

This isn’t to say that I hate flip-floppers or the art of waffling.  I’ve sure changed my mind on any number of issues over the years, which might explain why I’m driving a car with a freakin’ bud vase in it.  But when someone as prominent as Yon comes out with a call to speed the withdrawal of American forces we deserve more than a shrug and a retort, “because I said so.”

Yon should tell us when the tipping point came that made our blood-soaked expenditures override the benefits of continuing the conflict. He should pinpoint the opportunity costs lost elsewhere by investing billions in Kabul.  He must explain how the American government, military and people lack “seriousness” in a war that has killed or maimed many thousands of our troops and consumed hundreds of billions of our tax dollars, not to mention how greater effort could overcome other problems he has identified as today’s deal breakers.

Moreover, if we accept Michael at his word here, then he seems to be seriously suggesting that things were going swimmingly under Petraeus and on Sept. 7, the day after King David was sworn in as the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, it all went to hell.

That’s so implausible that it causes us to question his ability to analyze the war he’s been covering for the better part of a decade.  If he can’t come up with smarter analysis than that then we’re left with the uncomfortable fact that Yon has other reasons for asking us to leave Kabul.

And they’re not pretty.

*****

Gentle readers, as you know I’ve published many critical articles here about Yon’s recent toil in Afghanistan.  While I’ve praised his reporting on the scourge of IEDs  and his gritty combat correspondence with our junior troops, I’ve long challenged his rosy assessments of success  in the murky counterinsurgency war and his call for us to keep fighting for decades there.

In June, for example, Michael was telling us that ISAF was making “undeniable progress” and we could never leave Afghanistan because we can’t “unjump” from our decision to “Surge” troops there.

“Our people are fighting as you read this,” he added, draping himself in Old Glory and the troops.  “When we ordered our military to go, we cloaked ourselves in great responsibility to support them and to achieve success.”

When it came to questions about the perfidy of Hamid Karzai’s kleptocracy in Kabul or our own efforts to grow competent and tough Afghan Security Forces, Michael merely blurted that  “shouting at an oak tree will not make it grow faster,” and begged us to sit back and enjoy this “century-long process” to success.

In yesterday’s piece Michael fretted about “wasting lives and resources,” but only six months ago he urged Petraeus to forgo “any consideration of the U.S. economy, the debt or jobs in America” when advising the president because the general “is the man in the arena” and the rest of us just don’t count.

He closed his June piece with a saccharin admonition to keep fighting and dying so that a 4-year-old tot playing near his laptop could grow up and go to college.

Well, I said it then and I’ll repeat it now because my perspective hasn’t changed:

I just think our dead and those who are going to die tonight deserve a damn bit better than some hokum about a 4-year-old girl in Kabul, giddy hero worship of a four-star and a hollow pledge to give a century-long commitment of our nation’s best men and women to everlasting war in  Afghanistan, a nation that really doesn’t seem to care as much about the war as we do.

On the bright side, I guess Yon has 100 years to get it right.

A few weeks later, Michael doubled down on his pitch, assuring us in July that the “war in Afghanistan is turning around in our favor.  After nearly five years of yelling at the top of my lungs that we are losing, it’s a relief to write these words with confidence.”

Well, Mike’s confidence didn’t last 100 years.  His over-the-top horseshi**ery didn’t survive a whopping six months.

*****

So, what happened in those weeks?  I mean, how did we go so quickly from certain victory to absolute defeat?

The oplan Gen. Allen is using is pretty similar to the one cooked up by Petraeus and Stanley McChrystal when the former was running CENTCOM and the latter was running his big, fat, stupid mouth to Rolling Stone.  So that ain’t it.

The brutal recession the U.S. is mired in isn’t all that better or worse now than it was in July, and I can’t imagine that there have been any urgent global crises demanding more American ground forces, unless Mike knows something I don’t about Korea or Iran.

Pakistani perfidy is no more obvious today than it was in July.  There likely are just as many Pathans who hate foreign occupation and Karzai’s kleptocracy now as there were a mere six months ago, too.

Sure, our SEALs double-tapped Osama bin Laden, but that had zero effect on the larger counterinsurgency fight against the various Taliban.

While I respect Yon very much, it would be intellectually and ethically wrong for me to hold back.  So I’ll just put it out there:  The only freakin’ thing that’s really changed over the past half-year in Afghanistan and Pakistan is that the U.S. Army disembedded Michael Yon.

His slot got nixed three weeks after Petraeus left for Langley.

I strongly suspect that the primary reason the Army pulled it was because Michael asked hard questions about the service’s Medevac policy in the wake of the tragic death of Chazray Clark.  When I and Military​.com demanded the Army explain why they booted Yon, they wouldn’t even respond , so the lingering suspicion holds and it’s not going to change until commanders answer a few simple questions about their decision.

All of this nevertheless puts me in a pickle.

On one hand, I think the Army’s decision to remove Mike was cavalier and –  without any explanation for the embed’s termination — it borders on cowardice.  So I can’t fault him for that.  I also would have to admit that his writings on this blog have been some of the best things posted here, so I’ve benefited as much as anyone from Mike’s time and energy.  Plus I think that he’s identified an ongoing Medevac problem in Afghanistan, sparking a wider public debate on a crucial issue.  And I like the guy personally because he’s one of the nicest, most decent men I’ve ever met.

But that still doesn’t mean that Mike has a right to huff and call for an end to the war just because he got kicked out of Afghanistan and the Army slaps at him instead of dealing with the Medevac crisis.

Normally, I wouldn’t challenge him on this point, but he often makes his journalism as much about him as the war so I think it’s fair.

Sometimes that emphasis on personal reporting is great because it gives us a unique perspective on the war from the eyelevel of the grunt.  Other times, however, we’re left with him essentially yelling “trust me!” as he calls for a century of bloodletting because we’ve turned the corner and we’re winning and he swears Petraeus is a genius and blah blah blah.

When you personalize your journalism and your battlefield predictions you must make yourself accountable when both of them fall apart.

So the time has come.  Michael Yon, you should admit that you were wrong on Afghanistan.  If you can’t do that, then you have to better explain why you were right and it all went to hell anyway.

Either way, you must get off your ass and give your readers here a little more than an index card worth of analysis and a whopping thimble of accountability.

And they shouldn’t have to wait a century for it.

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Join the Conversation

Michael Yon makes the key point that the war in Afghanistan is a waste of blood and treasure. Isn’t that enough?

Not when he made the exact opposite point six months ago.

I guess Mr. Yon isn’t going to give us any more accounts similar to this one:
http://​youtu​.be/​q​4​r​o​x​M​8​h​UMk

I’m no expert and I haven’t looked at sites, comments, etc as long as Carl has, but I have to say that it seems to me that Yon has gotten more emotionally tied to the boots on the ground recently, not that the attachment is new, just that it seems more emotional than before. I don’t see a problem with that. I think he strongly believes in the capability of our fighting forces, but not so much in the infrastructure that runs them. And, I think the MEDEVAC issue may have put him over the top and the removal of embed status was the culminating event that shifted the paradigm for him.

I say this with no tie to anyone involved in this — it’s just speculation. But I can tell you that the Chazray Clark thing pisses me off and as someone that’s walked with and lead soldiers in combat, counted heads coming out of the ECP, etc, it’s frankly heart breaking to watch Clark on that litter while his BN Cdr is asking how many minutes ago the 9-Line was made, knowing the birds were only a few minutes flying time away. Yon was on that patrol, he took the video. We don’t need to dissect the situation to understand that a profound emotional effect can be produced from that.

War is a bad thing but so many of us seem to be so strongly drawn to it.

Don’t show that to Tom Ricks, Mark. He might confuse it with VPB Wanat.

Personally, I don’t think Yon “owes” us anything. Yes, it would be nice to know what it was that changed his mind and the full context of his post. You also don’t, I think, need to spend 1700 words to ask him about that.

Yes. I should’ve added another 300 choice words on what others are saying about his nonsense, but this is a family blog.

A, perhaps, larger question that falls out directly is: given Yon’s change of mindset, what does it take to generate that in more of our journalists? If Yon has fallen out of love with the idea of actions in Afghanistan (’bout time…) can this falling out be encouraged in others? Or can the effects — critical analysis of US and coalition actions there — be encouraged?

I agree that Yon’s piece would have been better if he had explained his change of heart. Or even overtly recognized that he had indeed expressed a significant change from just six months ago. Answering the ‘why’ in that change could allow others to follow the same path. Or so one might hope.

Wanna know the problem? Here it is in your own words.…

“Afghanistan, a nation that really doesn’t seem to care as much about the war as we do.”

Because they’re not the ones dying, being denied jobs, health, basic living standards etc etc etc. They’re not the ones still suffering 10 yrs into a war that the world’s superpower told them would be over by 2002, not the ones living in one of the world’s failed states after we essentially said we would rebuild their society in months.… even so poling 2011 showed 50+% support for the ISAF presence.…. I can understand the frustration of a grunt on the ground but not of an analyst who whitewashes these truths and I defy any American community to show the same faith and trust after a decade of fuckups

The fundamental of COIN is empathy — understanding the context w/in which occupants live and molding strategy around it — if you can’t accept these basic truths about why the average Afghan is frustrated with the US, then your analysis will naturally be lacking and the strategy you advocate will fail

_____

And Michael Yon now plays to his Facebook fan club — I suggest you see his rhetoric in that light

Carl said: “1) In the balance of expenditures and benefits, the war now costs us too much blood and treasure; 2) By spending billions of dollars there, we’re losing out on opportunities more valuable to American security; “

Response: 1) Inaccurate on the blood. This ten+ year war has cost us a minute portion of the blood experienced in Vietnam or by the Soviets in Afghanistan. No intent is made to downplay our servicemember’s sacrifice, though. However, their ultimate sacrifice has halted the westerly spread of Islamic extremism into the “stans” and south Russia.

Response: 2) For the first 8 years, the treasure aspect was equally miniscule which was what part of what led to Taliban resurgence. Since the surge, despite more troops at risk, fewer troops have died and more territory was secured while offensive night raids eliminated Taliban leaders. The cost has been high due to geography and the extensive reliance on USAF and USN/Marine airpower whose fuel costs have been high while ground combat got the cost blame…even though airpower would have great difficulty finding targets hidden in and hugging populations without those boots on the ground.

Also on number 2, I asked this of MikeF and will now ask Carl, Yon, and anyone else caring to answer. What would you have spent the billions on differently that would have eliminated a despot with control of a large portion of the world’s oil, and dethroned Islamic extremists dangerously close to nuclear weapons? Explain how you would have gotten funds to actually pass Congress in anywhere near similar total numbers without actual wars.

Seen state department budgets lately…not to mention their effectiveness? Explain how the Arab Spring would have resulted without the U.S. example of forcefully restoring democracy…even when the leaders we possibly wanted did not win.

Carl said: “3) It’s time for Afghan security forces and the central government to stand up and fight, and we’re retarding that; 4) Pakistan shall never become an ally of the U.S.;”

3) True, but we are not far from 2014 and progress was made last year. As long as a strong northern alliance exist with trained forces, the Taliban and Pakistan will not retake all of Afghanistan. 4) If you examine the recent CSBA study “Outside-In,” you identify some positive aspects that involve use of ground forces to stop Iran from closing the Straits of Hormuz.

The study notes the relative ease of securing parts of Iran closest to Pakistan with airborne, Rangers, and Marines. It notably omits Pakistan in its relatively lengthy list of base options for American fighter jets. Interesting, because it does include the northern stans…areas probably not accessible to us were it not for the positive relationship built over the last decade protecting their fellow Afghan Uzbeks, Tajiks, and Turkmen.

Continuing on number 4, if we also could restore our mutual trust with Pakistan, it would simplify Army heavy force landings in Pakistan, allowing us to simply fight our way into Iran along the coast without a forcible entry, semi-permanently occupying (until regime change) an easily resupplied area near the Straits.

Make a deal with Sunni Pakistan that we will let them expand the size of their country if they allow us an unobstructed entry into Shiite Iran. Talk about strategic depth to possibly expand a pipeline from the northern “stans” and through a small part of Afghanistan into Pakistan and to the sea….

Sure as &*^% wasn’t any of your blood, was it?

And I thought Yon was talking about Afghanistan… And isn’t your beef with him, not me? Or Mike Few?

This is like reading science fiction.

Mike Few is in the Building!!! What should we wasted 4–6 trillion on over the next decade? I’d submit ignoring little bullies who can barely contain control in their own states and focus on rebuilding our internal infrastructure, revamping our education system, paying living wages to our teachers, policemen, and firemen, getting control of our debt, and solving our own drug dependency (legal and illegal) problems.

Simply put, it’s time to rebuild that shining city on a hill.

But, I don’t consider Iran, China, N Korea, Russia, Venezuela, Mexico, or Canada (well, maybe Canada) a threat to our national security. As another great statesman said, “the only thing we have to fear is fear itself.”

I’ve got no beef with Yon or you and Mike. I disagree with the premise that Iraq and Afghanistan would have turned out better if we had bailed immediately after both major combat operations. I also think it unfair to tell those who have served and the families of the fallen that it was all a big mistake.

You might start by reading the CSBA study or at least its slide show. What’s fiction is one of its slides depicting AA/AD preventing fighters from flying far into Iran except from Turkey or well outside the Straits of Hormuz. Never mind that all manner of aerial refuelers would be over the top of Saudi Arabia.

However, they at least make an effort to include ground forces if you inform yourself on the correct slide. A heavy force invasion from Pakistan would be identical to all recent experiences where forcible entry simply was unnecessary because a willing ally knew which side to side with.…

The starting salary of a policeman in the bay area exceeds $80K and you can bet that given the direction of the California debt, some future democratic administation will figure out a way to bail out the state.

The $4–6 trillion figure is fantasy. Raising taxes on the wealthy would reduce our deficit. When Eisenhower made his famous speech the top tax rate was 91%. How is that war on drugs working out? If we had mandatory national service, we could get control of some of the other issues mentioned regarding excess costs for state and some federal workers (not DoD, my wife is DoD and has a fraction of the pay/benefits of most blue state workers).

Move Forward, I’m not sure how to answer your comment. I didn’t say anything about a war on drugs, bay area policemen, or raising or lowering taxes.

“the relative ease of securing parts of Iran,” “if we also could restore our mutual trust with Pakistan,” “allowing us to simply fight our way into Iran,” etc. What on earth is this cavalier nonsense? Do we need more ‘Risk: The Beltway Board Game”? Is it “Training Day II: President Alonzo Harris Busts Caps in Hormuz”? It is time for lessons learned, not doubling down on misadventure.

Move Forward,

Maybe you could get GEN. Musharraf to help out. Do a deal, run a coup, install the man into power. I’m sure he’d help out just like he did last time. This time, though, make sure to look under all the beds in Abbottabad and Rawalpindi.…

“On a recent visit to the United States, President Musharraf of Pakistan met with our President. (I know Musharraf well, and I have great respect for him.).…We can’t expect to get from Pakistan the effort needed to deal with the threat we see as most dangerous to us unless the complex issues that drive instability in Pakistan are resolved enough to permit Pakistan to act on that threat.” — GEN. Tony Zinni, “The Battle for Peace: A Frontline Vision of America’s Power and Purpose.“
.
LOL. Or, to be more Carl Prine-like, chortle-chortle. Chinese Generals must be rolling and LTAO.

You know what’s scary? We did kinda try what MF has suggested. The Bush and Obama administrations thought that they could use Pakistan’s help against Iran (Bush admin.) and the Taliban (Bush and Obama admin.) if only they helped address “instability in Pakistan” that supposedly keeps Pakistan from acting “on that threat.”

It would be hilarious if it hadn’t turned out so deadly for Americans. Good for the American National Security Apparatus that most Americans aren’t paying attention, to include defense planners, State Dept. officials, and Presidential hopefuls.

Come on Mike:

You said: “paying living wages to our teachers, policemen, and firemen”

My DoD civilian wife has been a child development teacher, supervisor, and CDL bus driver at varying levels of responsibility for 30 years. If she worked in a shore CA or MA city, or DC she would be getting that starting cops $80K with a retirement of $70K instead of the $4600 annuity and annual $40K income she has accumulated…and she will probably need to work until 67.

So you really believe that beating Iran would be harder than beating Iraq? Didn’t those two fight for years to a draw with Iraq having the far more superior armor force? How long would Amadinejad and Khameini last with US forces occupying the Straits and sanctions still in place on Iranian oil?

We don’t need to start anything. But continued threats by Iran raise the price of oil and Israel may not wait for permission. If we want to restore the economy, oil costs must decline which does not happen with Iran making constant threats which will expand when they have nukes. Of course we could keep blocking offshore and Alaska drilling and the Keystone pipeline. That would bring down the price of oil…oh wait.…

Not to pick on the good General, but there is this:

DIA: Is there any way to get Pakistan to be a more helpful ally in the war on terror?
.
Mr Zinni: Pakistan is now fighting the Taliban with a degree of commitment that could turn the tide there. They will need help in funding and resources to sustain it, but there seems to be popular, government, and military determination at this point. What’s needed now is regional cooperation.

http://​www​.economist​.com/​b​l​o​g​s​/​d​e​m​o​c​r​a​c​y​i​n​a​m​e​r​ica…

Sorry to go off topic a bit, Move Forward, but Pakistan is already everything we fear Iran is so if you want to deal with the Iran threat then think of a third option. I like the idea of drilling, too, and you know what? The Saudis are up to no good. I don’t believe for a second that they are seriously attempting internal reform.…Somehow, we are involved in the Saudi Iran Sunni Shia rivalry on one side when, from a US point of view, both losing would be ideal.…

Move Forward

That’s the problem. You assume and make up stuff from my replies based off your own politics and limited understanding of the problem sets. What I’m talking about is transcending the politics and working on our core issues at home.

1. What’s your point? You’re wife is a teacher who makes 40K. Hmm, wonder if she would fall in the category that I’m talking about?

2. War on Drugs is mutually exclusive to American’s fixing their drug problems. That starts at home, and it starts with doctors over-prescribing.

3. I find it funny that you would rather throw away our money overseas rather than using it at home investing in our future. You’re concerns about other nation’s problems is simply fear mongering.

“The fundamental of COIN is empathy — understanding the context w/in which occupants live and molding strategy around it…”

In a word: no. You do not mold national strategy around tactical means. COIN is, fundamentally, a set of tactics used on the ground to achieve specific goals and objectives. Our largest problems in Iraq and Afghanistan have been our complete and utter inability to formulate a cohesive national strategy that makes sense in these countries and regions. The average Afghan is frustrated with the US and coalition occupation because of our ADD-like approach to Afghanistan. One week it is small grants and loans, next week we’re handing out gift certificates for water treatment plants. The the only thing the Afghans can count on us for is money — unfortunately we never know what we will be spending the money on until we’re handing it out in bundles.

ID the strategy first, then decide whether COIN is the right tool and if it is how it will be executed. Empathy is cute, but useless in the face of no strategy. And “peace in Afghanistan” is not a strategy, it is a vague and not fully articulated goal.

#@!#@!!!&&%!! double posts! Apologies.

“The fundamental of COIN is empathy — understanding the context w/in which occupants live and molding strategy around it…”

If you believe that, then you’re an idiot.

“the fatal fallacy in the liberal theory of counterinsurgency, with the United States so often obliged to work through repressive local leadership, the reform component dwindled into ineffectual exhortation.” Schlesinger, Arthur, Jr (1977) Robert Kennedy and His Times

“…they [counterinsurgent] should be aware, too, that aid programs and various other attempts to raise the people’s standard of living have never yet yielded the desired results.” RAND, COIN symposium, 1962

Great reply and maybe empathy isn’t the right word.

But you are barking up the same tree as I am. The ADD-village stimulus you point to is for example yet another instance where we simply cannot meet the needs of Afghans at the village level — why? Yes, part is bureaucratic nightmare, lack of strategic vision but also quite simply because 10-yrs in we still don’t really understand Afghanistan — or at least the ones who do are vastly outnumbered by those who don’t.

Whatever you may think US strategy is (I’d charitably say at this point its not much more than build the ANSF and pray they don’t break come 2015) in this context I think its somewhat irrelevant. As you noted at the tactical level we have identified COIN as the tool, and we utilize its principles — the problem is those principles need to be interpreted, adapted and calibrated to work effectively in AFG’s unique environment. Unfortunately appropriate and sensitive policies are hampered by our knowledge gap (which is derived from an empathy gap) and if you are throwing around statements like “Afghans don’t care about the war” well then you are culpable in contributing to that gap.

John, see below. Of course you need empathy, but not social welfare. Understanding the problem and trying to fix it are two different things.

“the fatal fallacy in the liberal theory of counterinsurgency, with the United States so often obliged to work through repressive local leadership, the reform component dwindled into ineffectual exhortation.” Schlesinger, Arthur, Jr (1977) Robert Kennedy and His Times

“…they [counterinsurgent] should be aware, too, that aid programs and various other attempts to raise the people’s standard of living have never yet yielded the desired results.” RAND, COIN symposium, 1962

Let me break this down 1 by 1 .

1) 2,876 coalition KIA, 14,323 US wounded is pretty significant blood in any scenario, more so when its not mine or yours, and especially when we are expending it over a country that will contribute nothing tangible to the US interest for decades to come (in best case), in worst case doing nothing more than delaying/amplifying a problem that will remain when we leave.
1.5) Russia??? Extremism up to the Northern stans?? Read up on history son. There was virtually no jihadi spillover when the Soviets w/drew and I think the Russians do plenty to inflame their Muslim population in the N. Caucasus, with or without Afghanistan

2) No. Just no. If you think our treasure expended on AFG was marginal, you live on the moon. Forgetting the hundreds of billions we are spending now, even post-2014 if we spend say just the minimum $3bn to sustain the ANSF, that would be the same as what we give to Israel’s IDF. Money well spent? After all the two are identical in their contributions to the US strategic interest, no?

3) If the Northern Alliance forces as you put them hold and the rest of Afghanistan does not, it turns into what is known affectionately as civil war. Maybe the whole country won’t fall but we went to war to close the ‘ungoverned spaces where terrorists find sanctuary’ not expand them w/ factional infighting like the early 1990s

4) Loony Toons happening here. Go ahead, mount up and conduct your “heavy force landings” in Pakistan. Are you nuts? Forget the US-PAK strategic mismatch why in holy hell would Pakistan effectively go to war for you against their larger neighbor?

Bwah, can;t believe I wasted my time.

The terrain is tougher for speed and direction of movement and complicates ISR. We don’t have a secure rear area with ports airfields and endless space to build-up and train as we have in Kuwait, or had in Saudi in 1990. Memories of and erroneous predictions/conclusions about OPEC’s machinations circa early 70s were too persuasive in our Earnest Will and Desert Shield rationale. Fretting commodities supply sources and trade route security is 19th century thinking and our government is merely distracting itself by elevating sideshows to importance.

I just bought a time-share in Abbottabad.

Pssssstttt. Vietnam guys and your families, don’t read the newspapers!

Weak, non-factual response. Obviously the deaths and injuries are tragic but small in comparison to past conflicts. Why aren’t our historians out there contrasting the artillery bombardments of WWI and II to show that despite heavy bombardment, ground forces can survive. This 1500 Chinese (or less for Iran) TBM A2/AD stuff against multiple targets is historically non-consequential compared to a 10 hour artillery preparation with one million shells in a 30 x 5 km area during WWI’s Battle of Verdun..

A quick look at several JOG-Air maps accessible via the University of Texas map library reveals obvious axis of advance along the coast and 100 miles inland leading from Pakistan. Iran has 70 million. Pakistan has 180 million and nukes. Any more questions?

Speaking of profoundly “non-factual,” it’s pretty obvious that one would need to consider several things before blurting, idiotically, something along the lines of “Wow, golly, we just haven’t killed hundreds of thousands so it must all be worth it!”

The point of that noun called “strategy” is to link all elements of our diplomatic, espionage, economic and military power to achieve realistic foreign policy goals. If these elements of power can’t achieve them, then those deaths, which you f***ing consider so f***ing trivial, become amoral.

I’m not sure that you have fully appreciated how insensitive your comments sound. The fact that you have a eel-like grasp on facts and reasoning also should give you pause, not to mention that you’re asking critics of Yon’s piece somehow to defend it.

I have no idea what to make of that.

Another thing that you might consider is that a key reason more people aren’t dead — even though the wound rate for frontline troops in OIF and OEF is similar to Vietnam and other modern wars — is because of factors that have absolutely nothing to do with guerrilla warfare but rather because of innovations in field medicine and personal/vehicular armor.

IEDs that would’ve killed someone in Vietnam didn’t harm tens of thousands of soldiers and Marines enough to remove them from the battlefield. Whether the over-blast from these munitions has caused different problems is another question, but the reality is that today many combatants walk away from a triple-stacked IED, whereas three artillery shells exploding on someone’s truck in WWII would’ve left it as ash.

I’m starting to think that believing in what you’re fighting for is a conscious choice, regardless of the actual conflict; how other of your fellow vets were able to go through the same war and come to a totally different conclusion is maddening.….

Uhhhh, I don’t speak for all vets and I would call anyone who tried to do so a fraud.

Polls continue to show that veterans of OIF and OEF are divided on the wars but have done their duty regardless of their positions one way or the other.

That’s because they’re Americans first and professionals.
http://​www​.csmonitor​.com/​U​S​A​/​M​i​l​i​t​a​r​y​/​2​0​1​1​/​1​0​0​5/W…

I have no idea what I was trying to say in this last comment. Good grief, the free association comments I write at times. Hmmm, I only flipped through the Zinni book but I am reading Posner’s “Secrets of the Kingdom” (on Saudi Arabia) so maybe that is what prompted my strange commentary.

I don’t want a more overt conflict with Iran. Please tell me we are not backing ourselves into such a thing. Look at how supersititious I am! I won’t even type out the word W-A-R.

@ Dave Foster — that is a very intriguing comment! If you would like (and if you return to this thread), can you expand on the point a bit? This is very interesting: “Fretting commodities supply sources and trade rout security is 19th century thinking and our government is merely distracting itself by elevating sideshows to importance.”

Why didn’t I just cut and paste instead of attempting a retype? I am such a terrible writer.…

Understood; I was referring to the Vietnam War.….

I wish there was more reporting and less journaling going on here and the media as a whole.

At the risk of saying the obvious, this is an OPINION blog. If you want reporting, buy a subscription to your local newspaper.

“Another thing that you might consider is that a key reason more people aren’t dead — even though the wound rate for frontline troops in OIF and OEF is similar to Vietnam and other modern wars — is because of factors that have absolutely nothing to do with guerrilla warfare but rather because of innovations in field medicine and personal/vehicular armor.”

Perhaps you can elaborate on how 300,000 wounded in Vietnam correlates to 14.000 wounded in Afghanistan over a similar time frame. Don’t forget that the Soviets had 14,000 dead over their ten years. If it is a function of numbers of troops, why did fatalities decrease during the surge? If the surge was not a factor, why were British and Canadian results so mediocre relative to US contributions to Helmand and Kandahar provinces when the US took charge with greater numbers? Consider that many of the severely injured who survived Afghanistan wounds would have been added to the death tolls in earlier wars. Instead they survived and instead of being added to a relatively small death toll…they exaggerated the number of wounded, but not killed.

Statistics can lie at times. Other times, such as your comments about technology’s contribution, they tell the genuine story.…name-calling aside.

I was speaking to both OIF and OEF. MEDCOM did a pretty good study of Iraq wounds and found the rate of incidences to be the same, but the survivability to be multiples higher.

They even broke down Fallujah and compared it to Hue.

The important thing to remember is that far more troops served in Vietnam. Span of years isn’t important. It’s the rate of incidences.

The only people currently who are saying anything has improved in Afghanistan is NATO (as the member nations leave).

UN reporting for security incidents paints a very different picture of Afghanistan, and the NGOs tend to back the UN analysis.

But keep drinking it. You might be the last true believer.

Vietnam
1967 486,000 troops at end of year, 11,153 killed, or one in 44 killed
1968 537,000 troops at end of year, 16,592 killed, or one in 32 killed
Afghanistan
2010 98,000 troops at end of year, 499 killed, or one in 196 killed
2011 91,000 troops at end of year (far more during year), 418 killed, or one in 218 killed

Forgive the heartlessness of this analysis. I believe it is a necessary one to counter cynics who heartlessly reduce the morale of serving service members by disparaging their reason for serving and doubting the success of their efforts.

Numbers reveal trends that war critics are unable to fathom unless facts are in their face. Because they cannot recognize the surge’s success and that lack of earlier resources created the Taliban resurgence, they spread negativism thus encouraging a faster withdrawal. The resulting fewer troops now are more likely to be injured because they no longer dominate as much area on the battlefield.

Perhaps we forget that we have lost fewer Soldiers in a decade than were lost in a few hours of Sept 2001. Perhaps most do not comprehend how close Iran is to getting nukes, or how many could die if al Qaeda or LeT accessed a Pakistani nuke.

Oh. I see. Well, then the wars were won years ago and the continued fighting and lack of political solutions (that pesky Clausewitz!) merely statistical outliers you can fathom but others in the reality-based community can’t.

As I’ve long argued, you’re making a faith-based argument. Reality doesn’t matter.

I don’t think that you know what you’re talking about. Mortalities do NOT tell the story of “success.” The point of fighting wars (crazy thought coming! crazy thought coming!) is to achieve realistic foreign policy solutions.

If we have not met those desired end states then it doesn’t matter what the casualties were.

Moreover, you’re not grasping the point I made. It is obvious to everyone who has studied this issue that armor and field medicine innovations have led to much higher survivability rates.

The downside, of course, is that we’re looking at probably 500,000 TBI cases, or more, in both wars by the time we’re done fighting. The long-term effects of that sort of wound in such a large cohort is unknown. The only similar types of populations would be boxers, football players and the like.

The good news is that many of those 500,000 troops would’ve been dead in Vietnam, Korea or WWII. The bad news is that many of them might wish decades later that they were.

Forgive the obviousness of this analysis. I think it’s necessary to counter optimists who mindlessly reduce reason and facts by disparaging the mental acuity of those who serve by pointing out the reality of their service.

Chortle, chortle…

Carl said: “I don’t think that you know what you’re talking about. Mortalities do NOT tell the story of “success.” The point of fighting wars (crazy thought coming! crazy thought coming!) is to achieve realistic foreign policy solutions.”

Says the National Guard Specialist who thinks he knows more than the Generals recommending surges that he belittles…while you cite that the sky will fall if an unlikely terrorist should succeed in attacking a stateside chemical plant or train…and you claim Soldiers in Vietnam would have been better off without Hueys.…

Realistic foreign policy solution: Prevent terrorist access to nuclear weapons and other realistic mass-casualties producing terrorist weapons. Prevent a nuclear Iran. Read the article recommended by twitter commenters at SWJ (Peter Munson and Doctrine Man are clueless?) on the Israeli perspective on Iran nukes. Do you see the Israelis packing it up and giving up because it’s hard?

The problem is that some of us knew more about Iraq than the generals.

I haven’t lost any wars. They have.

So, your point again? Or are you seriously going to compare me to the effing dullards who exploited a bureaucracy to pick up their stars?

I need to ask because — unlike generals — I actually survive by my wits in an intellectually competitive marketplace.

I’ve seen more combat than the vast majority of our generals. I’m better educated. I make more money. And, frankly, I’m a better citizen. I gave up those spoils to serve as a SPC in the Army.

Would any of them do that? Hardly. Many perfumed princes can’t wipe their own asses without a platoon of handlers to ensure they don’t walk around with poop hands.

Some of the dumbest sons of bitches I’ve ever met were generals. I mean ASVAB-waiver stupid. But they were relentless in careerism during an era of easy promotions, so they got their stars.

And I also know that a decade-long COIN campaign in Afghanistan and a similar outing in Iraq did nothing — absolutely effing nothing — to safeguard nuclear weapons in Pakistan or deter their production in Iran.

Nothing. Zilch. Nada.

But we did kill, maim or injure more than a half-million combatants — almost none of them generals — and spend upwards of $6 trillion on two wars so that someone could post on a blog that we won, even if few Americans or our enemies believe it.

Thanks, generals.

And this still doesn’t answer a salient question: Why the *&^% are you arguing with me over a brief article written by Michael Yon?

I called him out on it. We seem to have lost sight of that.

Assertions about the consequences of resource embargoes, shortages, or supply chain disruptions are overwrought. If the WWII rubber shortage was not the most significant instance of something of an actual inconvenience, it is likely the most famous. The OPEC ’73-’74 business — a ‘price explosion’ I’ve seen it termed — was a virtual/conceptual crisis. The receptors for energy panic were primed in 1973. During the summer of 1970, several brownouts and energy shortages in the northeast became a minor panic, and served as a prop for more heated rhetoric about ‘energy independence’, something very much in the political water of the late 60s/early 70s. (cont)

But what really happened? A disruption in the supply/pricing equilibrium for a short time. I recall sitting in the back seat of our whale-like Impala on the odd or even day or whatever the rationing scheme then was a few times. Concurrently our energy policy was very concerned with reports of an impending global uranium shortage, which, it was asserted, would doom our nascent nuclear power industry (20 generating units in 1970 for 1.4% of total national electricity production ramped up to 112 units in 1990 — the peak — for 20%. Source: the EIA) and which emplaced, again it was asserted, that much more criticality to our breeder reactor R&D, since the breeder form would produce fissionable material rather than simply consume it. An example. (cont)

Others are more mundane: some bickering over steel tariffs, concern for the rare earth element supply, etc, now and again but nothing enduringly or even much more than temporarily significant, and none of them — maybe the rubber for a while, but our synthetic capability was already ramping up — national security issues, merely trade delegation and diplomatic issues. Whether Mahanian aspects such as open sea lines of communication — and, is our navy that actually keeps these “open” or is it simply global trade — are issues that we should invest in, well, it is one thing to work toward generally open lines of communication for ourselves and for all, it is another thing, an incorrect thing, to equate our national security, thus military, responsibilities with the just in time global supply chain. (cont)

If it was bad form in that brief era of good feeling known as the New World Order for countries to invade and rape other countries, and so in that light we — even the Soviets, tacitly — saw need to boot Saddam from Kuwait, as for Kuwaiti or even Saudi oil, if the Iraqis had managed to take Saudi, what was Saddam going to do with that oil? Eat it? Producers of natural resources are getting global commodity prices and consumers generally have few significant obstacles to their acquisition. Even if Hormuz was to close for a period of time, would that interruption be more significant than the aggregate of the sturm und drang and cat & mouse of the last several decades on the issue? Where’s the evidence of resource constraint implications over the last century? Much talk and erroneous myth of spice and guano supply monopolizing sort from the age of sail.

Uhm, is the argument “Its not so bad as Vietnam, so that means its all good”? When did a total clusterfuck become the basis for analysis?

My goodness. You going to be invading Iran, sweeping in from Afghanistan with the aid of a Pakistani Army Like Rommel and the italians? Triumphal march down the main road of Tehran, with roses in the air, right?

Thank you!

For those of you too pithy to listen to a mere specialist, I’d recommend Dick Betts new book.

American American Force: Dangers, Delusions, and Dilemmas in National Security (A Council on Foreign Relations Book)
by Richard K. Betts

While American national security policy has grown more interventionist since the Cold War, Washington has also hoped to shape the world on the cheap. Misled by the stunning success against Iraq in 1991, administrations of both parties have pursued ambitious aims with limited force, committing the country’s military frequently yet often hesitantly, with inconsistent justification. These ventures have produced strategic confusion, unplanned entanglements, and indecisive results. This collection of essays by Richard K. Betts, a leading international politics scholar, investigates the use of American force since the end of the Cold War, suggesting guidelines for making it more selective and successful.

Betts brings his extensive knowledge of twentieth century American diplomatic and military history to bear on the full range of theory and practice in national security, surveying the Cold War roots of recent initiatives and arguing that U.S. policy has always been more unilateral than liberal theorists claim. He exposes mistakes made by humanitarian interventions and peace operations; reviews the issues raised by terrorism and the use of modern nuclear, biological, and cyber weapons; evaluates the case for preventive war, which almost always proves wrong; weighs the lessons learned from campaigns in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Vietnam; assesses the rise of China and the resurgence of Russia; quells concerns about civil-military relations; exposes anomalies within recent defense budgets; and confronts the practical barriers to effective strategy. Betts ultimately argues for greater caution and restraint, while encouraging more decisive action when force is required, and he recommends a more dispassionate assessment of national security interests, even in the face of global instability and unfamiliar threats.

We construct hypotheses about the implications of events and often enough these are thoughtful and plausible. But this doesn’t mean they are important enough for bellicosity and scare mongering. Not saying that something aren’t at that level of importance, and it is easier obviously in hindsight to determine the context, but I’d argue that history shows that most hypotheses about dire consequences are overblown and so heavy skepticism is required for all pronouncements asserting national importance.

Carl — do you have a link to that study?

Hear, hear.

I’m looking for it, DF. It’s in the Outlook somewhere.

It’s a good thing “Moving Forward” doesn’t use his real name. He’d have to own some of his nonsense.

“For those of you too pithy to listen to a mere specialist…”

I contrast what I knew as an E-4 to what I knew when I left the Army as a an officer, to what many of the full colonels to 3-star generals know who served decades through Desert Storm, the Balkans, Afghanistan, and Iraq. There is no comparison. Nor was their service and rank the result of careerism. I do listen carefully to the experiences of multi-tour E-4s through E-6s that I instruct.

Mike, you and all the current Generals I went to school with passed 4 semesters of West Point math. I have my doubts that Carl would have. My Valedictorian, biochem Magna Cum Lauda daughter is a brilliant 3rd year Med student. That doesn’t mean she should be providing advice or passing judgment on multi-year doctors.

Welcome to the rest of us who aren’t as smart as you.….

And, hey, Move Forward, thank you for your combat service.

Oh, that’s right.

Moving_Forward has once again touched on your main fault: You think you’re smarter than everyone else. You may be; but that doesn’t make you any more right.…..

My complete problem prior to this was Yon’s “Grapes” posting of the wounding, suffering and ultimate death of Chazray Clark in graphic detail for all to see, including his family. No father, mother, brother, sister, husband or wife should ever have the graphic details publically posted for all, including them to read. What level of nightmares for the family continue due to this man’s inconsideration! This distate I have is all multiplied by his video of the carnage and the publication of the same. The continued arguments surrounding the medivac issue bought about in the Clark loss do not allow some members of the 4–4 Cav to find closure. My son served with the 4–4 Cav prior to his SF selection. Mr. Yon’s elevation of this whole Clark/medivac issue has brought him dislike by the majority of the troops. The 4–4 is now back home, they were Yon’s last embed, and most of them hopes he never gets another. Yon lost his embed due to his “grapes” blog and has done nothing but make matters worse for the military since. This is just his final act of many that ultimately will impact those on the ground serving. He has no care for the troops. Whatever concern he used to have he has lost.

I don’t want to start a war with you, I’m just saying the graphic nature of the post should never have been public

when families are notified of a death they are not told how many legs and arms were blown off, how the tourniquets made him scream, their family member laying in the dust and blood

could you please reference other articles that include both the injuries in graphic detail and the soldier’s name, I believe you’ll have a hard time finding any

I’ve never seen it before at 60 years old, as a veteran from a family that has family members now serving

Yon lost his embed for his classless reporting which too place PRIOR to any claim that it was the way the family wanted them remebered, Yon is using them at pawns on the medivac issue to get back at the Army for him losing his embed, it’s as simple as that!

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