Why Can’t the Pentagon Keep a Secret?
Gen. Stanley McChrystal may be chagrinned, or perhaps even angry, that his confidential (but not classified) 66-page commander’s assessment outlining the grim prospects for Afghanistan has been posted in full searchable form on the website of the Washington Post.
Whatever his reaction, I would hope it’s not surprise. Pentagon and military officials are often slack-jawed how fast supposedly secret, or “close hold” information leaks into the press. They have a right to be appalled, but not shocked. Almost everything leaks in Washington.
As a reporter, my response to official complaints about leaks was: “If you want something to stay secret, then keep it secret.”
That’s not so easy at the Pentagon. Too many people have access to information for it to stay under wraps forever. It’s the age-old dilemma. It’s not that I can’t keep a secret, it’s the people I tell who can’t keep a secret. (And I specifically told them not to tell anyone else, unless they made that person promise not to tell either.) As soon as enough people know, it soon becomes impossible for some people to contain themselves.
So, the likely reason McChrystal commander’s assessment is now available for anyone, including the Taliban and al Qaeda to read is that someone in the military or the Pentagon thought there would be some benefit to the information being public.
Maybe the leaker thought American’s had a right to read McChrystal clear-eyed view, or maybe he or she thought the document wasn’t all that much different from McChrystal’s public statements. (It’s not, but it does confirm what NPR’s Tow Bowman called the “worst kept secret in Washington,” that McChrystal wants more troops.) Or maybe the leaker just wanted to curry favor with the Washington Post’s Bob Woodward.
It’s even possible that McChrystal himself is the leaker. We’ll probably, never know.
Meanwhile his unvarnished assessment is very interesting reading. Some key quotes:
“We face both a short and long-term fight. The long-term fight will require patience and commitment, but I believe the short-term fight will be decisive. Failure to gain the initiative and reverse insurgent momentum in the near-term (next 12 months) — while Afghan security capacity matures — risks an outcome where defeating the insurgency is no longer possible.”
“I do not underestimate the enormous challenges in executing this new strategy; however, we have a key advantage: the majority of Afghans do not want a return of the Taliban.”
“The situation in Afghanistan is serious. The mission is achievable, but success demands a fundamentally new approach — one that is properly resourced and supported by better unity of effort.”
“Our campaign in Afghanistan has been historically under-resourced and remains so today… Resources will not win this war, but under-resourcing could lose it.”
“The situation in Afghanistan is serious. The mission is achievable, but success demands a fundamentally new approach — one that is properly resourced and supported by better unity of effort.”
“ISAF is not adequately executing the basics of counterinsurgency warfare… ISAF is a conventional force that is poorly configured for COIN, inexperienced in local languages and culture, and struggling with challenges inherent to coalition warfare…We cannot succeed simply by trying harder; ISAF must now adopt a fundamentally new approach.”
Finally, McChrysal takes heat in the writing of Afghan Defense Minister Wardak, who he quotes:
“Victory is within our grasp provided that we recommit ourselves based on lessons learned and provided that we fulfill the requirements needed to make success inevitable… I reject the myth advanced in the media that Afghanistan is a ‘graveyard of empires’ and that the U.S. and NA TO effort is destined to fail. Afghans have never seen you as occupiers, even though this has been the major focus of the enemy’s propaganda campaign. Unlike the Russians, who imposed a government with an alien ideology, you enabled us to write a democratic constitution and choose our own government. Unlike the Russians, who destroyed our country, you came to rebuild.”
I want to believe Wardak. It sounds great. But the next 12 months will show if his insight is real, or Panglossian self-delusion.
